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AbSTRAcT
The United Nations Special Procedures system was described by former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan as “the crown jewel” of the UN Human Rights 
Machinery. Yet, in recent years, the system has expanded rapidly, driven by 
states creating new mandates frequently on topics not traditionally viewed 
as human rights. This article explores the connection between forms of 
governance and the states voting for and promoting these newer mandates. 
We explore states’ potential motivations for expanding the system and the 
impact on international human rights law. This article forms an important 
part of discussions about Special Procedures and rights proliferation.
I. INTRoDUcTIoN 
In recent years the issue of human rights proliferation has emerged as a 
topic of discussion among human rights academics, diplomats, and activ-
ists. Human rights proliferation refers to the increasing number of treaties, 
resolutions, bodies, and institutions that focus on human rights. The United 
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Nations Human Rights Council’s adoption of ever more Special Procedures 
mandates significantly contributes to these developments. The Special Proce-
dures system has existed for nearly five decades and, at the time the Human 
Rights Council was created in 2006, there were forty-one mandates.1 As of 
August 2015, an additional fourteen mandates have been adopted. As Ted 
Piccone and Marc Limon have noted, if the current trajectory of the adop-
tion of Special Procedure mandates is upheld, there will be 100 mandates 
in 2030.2 The proliferation of Special Procedure mandates raises questions 
of whether they strengthen human rights protection and promotion through 
increasing awareness and widening the scope of topics to be included un-
der the umbrella of human rights, or if expansion weakens the system by 
diluting core rights, reducing resources available to mandate holders, and 
providing a smokescreen for states seeking to avoid scrutiny of their record 
on fundamental human rights. 
One way of answering those questions is to investigate the voting records 
on Special Procedures in order to determine whether or not they reveal a 
pattern of how states vote on and advance different categories of thematic 
mandates. The purpose of our research is to explore whether or not forms 
of governance and states’ human rights ideologies are linked to the types of 
rights that they have promoted or supported through the vehicle of Special 
Procedure mandates. Empirical research on states’ voting records is used 
to analyze the broader issues and patterns that are ongoing across the UN 
human rights machinery. Finally, we use the research findings to support 
analysis of states’ potential motivations for their strategies vis-à-vis the type 
of rights they promote when voting for Special Procedures. The research that 
we have undertaken on this specific part of the UN human rights machin-
ery is part of broader, ongoing debates about how to address the potential 
problems and pitfalls of rights inflation. 
II. bAckGRoUND: HUMAN RIGHTS cATEGoRIES AND IDEoLoGIES
In order to investigate whether or not there is a link between the countries at 
the fore of rights proliferation and state governance, and to understand the 
impact this has on the international human rights law system, it is crucial 
to understand the three categories of human rights, though any such firm 
categorization in itself is debatable. Karel Vasak talks about three generations 
of rights based on the French principles of liberté, egalité, and fraternité.3 
  1. Marc LiMon & Ted Piccone, HuMan rigHTs sPeciaL Procedures: deTerMinanTs of infLuence, 
universaL rigHTs grouP 8 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/reports/2014/03/19-un-human-rights-experts-evaluation-piccone/un-human-
rights-experts-evaluation-piccone.pdf.
  2. Id. at 2.
  3. Karel Vasak, Les Différentes Catégories des Droits de L’homme, in Les diMensions uni-
verseLLes des droiTs de L’HoMMe, Vol. I. (Lapeyre, de Tinguy & Vasak eds.,1990). Although 
Donnelly insists that all human rights require collective action for realization. See Jack 
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Vasak links Civil and Political Rights (CPRs) to liberty; Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCRs) are connected to equality through social justice; and 
Third Generation Rights (TGRs), also known as solidarity or collective rights, 
embody the idea of fraternity.4 The first two categories of rights are well ex-
plored, although the categories are not always water-tight: Civil and Political 
Rights5 focus on fundamental freedoms and civil liberties of the individual 
and were historically linked with liberal democracies and the rule of law. 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights6 often—but not exclusively—focus 
on states’ positive obligations to provide, or to provide access to, certain 
services or standards. Third Generation Rights are the newest, and therefore 
least established, set of rights that generally involve a collective element 
and benefit for society.7 
It is somewhat crude to categorize every human right according to these 
three generations, but the categories provide a useful tool for seeking to 
understand the ideologies underpinning different types of rights. Different 
forms of governance and governmental ideologies8 affect the development of 
rights. Indeed, the Universal Declaration was subsequently codified into two 
conventions split between CPRs9 and ESCRs,10 owing, inter alia, to resistance 
to one or other category by countries ideologically opposed to those types 
of rights or the justiciability thereof.11 That relationship between types of 
governments and human rights has continued despite many states formally 
committing to the principle of the interdependence, interrelatedness, and 
indivisibility of all rights.12 
The United Nations’ official position is that the sets of rights are equal, 
overlap, and are interdependent and indivisible—that is, they cannot exist 
   Donnelly, The Theology of the Right to Development: A Reply to Alston, 15 caL. W. 
inT’L L.J. 521 (1985).
  4. Id.
  5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
  6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
  7. Currently, there does not yet exist one consolidated international convention on this 
category of rights, albeit some have been enshrined within treaties.
  8. Ideologies can be defined as patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and concepts, 
carrying claims to social truth, as for example expressed in liberalism, conservatism and 
socialism. Cf. PauL JaMes & Manfred sTeger, gLobaLizaTion and cuLTure voLuMe 4: ideoLogies 
of gLobaLisM (2010).
  9. ICCPR, supra note 5.
 10. ICESCR, supra note 6.
 11. As well as difficulties in identifying concrete obligations under ESCRs.
 12. Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International 
Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 
98 aM. J. inT’L L. 462 (Paul James & Manfred B. Steger eds., 2004); danieL J. WHeLan, 
indivisibiLiTy of HuMan rigHTs: a HisTory (2010).
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without each other.13 Since the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion at the 1993 World Conference on human rights, the indivisibility of 
all human rights has been a cornerstone of the international human rights 
movement. The concept of indivisibility highlights that all rights are inter-
woven within a general framework of international human rights law and 
that one category of rights cannot be realized fully without the implemen-
tation of the other set.14 However, it is not clear from state practice at the 
national level or, indeed, from voting records at the HRC that the concept 
of indivisibility is an accurate reflection of how states actually view and 
approach human rights. As we shall see, there is a significant difference in 
how regional groups and political blocs support or place greater emphasis 
on different categories of rights. 
Countries such as China and the United States make their human rights 
ideologies clear through ratification of human rights treaties. China, on the 
one hand, is not party to the ICCPR,15 while the US is not party to the IC-
ESCR. Other countries have adopted a more intermediate position, with an 
increase in states including ESCRs in their constitutions as well as a greater 
willingness of judiciaries to enforce such rights. However, the majority of 
states—including many liberal democracies—do not have a well developed 
set of ESCRs in their national constitutions,16 and those that do often dif-
ferentiate between the status that they afford to ESCRs and CPRs.17 Regional 
 13. E.g. 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must 
be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
   Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted 25 June 1993, U.N. GAOR, 
World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993). 
 14. E.g. ICESCR, supra note 6, pmbl.
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social 
and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.
 15. ICCPR, supra note 5.
 16. Even where Western governments have taken a position that supports the equal status 
and importance of ESCRs they frequently fail to take legislative, administrative or judicial 
measures based explicitly on the recognition of specific ESCRs as international human 
rights or to provide effective redress for alleged violations of those rights. This is evi-
denced by the comparatively rare invocation of ESCRs in national systems as compared 
with the much more frequent invocations of civil and political treaty rights. 
 17. sociaL rigHTs JurisPrudence eMerging Trends in inTernaTionaL and coMParaTive LaW (Malcolm 
Langford ed., 2008); Christian Bjørnskov & Jacob Mchangama, Do Social Rights Affect 
Social Outcomes? (forthcoming).
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human rights, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, focus overwhelmingly on 
CPRs.18 Although ESCRs have more recently been added into the EU Charter 
on Fundamental Rights, the Charter offers a more robust protection of CPRs 
than ESCRs. The differences between the legal status of CPRs and ESCRs are 
significant, but they are far less pronounced than the differences between 
those two categories of rights and TGRs. Unlike CPRs and ESCRs, TGRs are 
yet to be codified in a legally binding treaty and are unclear in terms of 
normative content. This is demonstrated by the difficulties faced by the UN 
Human Rights Committee and regional organizations when addressing al-
leged violations of such rights. Indeed, relatively few states have sought to 
enshrine and uphold such rights and, when they have, the rights have been 
framed within national constitutions as individual as opposed to collective 
rights, as is the case with the right to peace in Costa Rica.19 
International human rights law is developed, promoted, and protected 
at the universal level through the UN human rights machinery. From an 
idealist perspective, as a universal organization the UN is best placed to 
develop, monitor, and protect rights across all regions and countries. That 
machinery includes a universal body (the Human Rights Council), treaty-
based bodies, Special Procedures mandate holders, and the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Although the scope and jurisdiction 
of each body varies, the interrelationship between them enables effective 
monitoring, fact-finding, recommendations, and technical assistance for 
states in relation to different human rights obligations. In order to examine 
the expansion of international human rights standards, we focus on one 
aspect of that machinery: the Special Procedures system.
Special Procedures is a system of independent experts appointed for fixed 
terms to examine either human rights generally within a specific country or 
one thematic right across the world. Mandates are almost exclusively created 
by states members of the Human Rights Council,20 which means that such 
processes are shaped as much, if not more, by political than by legal objec-
 18. At the time of writing in 2014 only three Western democracies—Spain, Portugal, and 
Slovakia—have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, supra note 6. 
 19. See, e.g., Costa Rica as a Peaceful State: One Costa Rican Lawyer’s Odyssey v. His 
Nation’s Establishment, counciL on HeMisPHeric affairs (19 Mar. 2010), available at http://
www.coha.org/costa-rica-as-a-peaceful-state-one-costa-rican-lawyer%E2%80%99s-
odyssey-v-his-nation%E2%80%99s-establishment/; Benjamin A. Peters, Security without 
Deadly Violence, in  non-KiLLing, securiTy and THe sTaTe 179, 188–90 (Joám Evans Pim ed., 
2013) concerning Ruling 9992–040; L.R Zamora Bolanos, The Lowest Form of Military 
Aggression, aMericas PrograM, (10 Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cipamericas.org/
archives/2885; Benjamin A. Peters, Security Without Deadly Violence, Costa Rica’s 
Potential as a Nonkilling State, in non-KiLLing, securiTy and THe sTaTe, supra, at 188–90 
(2013) concerning Executive Order 33240–S (2006).
 20. The other, albeit rarely used, method is the creation of a special representative of the 
Secretary-General.
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tives. Mandate holders are independent of both the United Nations and of 
their sending states and, at least in theory and in the majority of cases, are 
experts either on human rights generally or on a specific aspect of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law (IHRL). Mandate holders promote human rights 
through monitoring, fact-finding, reporting, and providing recommendations. 
They undertake country visits and engage with nonstate actors, national hu-
man rights institutions, and victims of violations. Although countries choose 
whether or not to allow mandate holders into their territories, the role of 
Special Procedures is an intrusive one as they very publicly present their 
findings as to weaknesses in states’ compliance with human rights.
III. METHoDoLoGY 
When examining countries’ voting records, a number of factors are relevant 
including: membership of regional groups, state alliances, vote trading, and 
foreign policy considerations. While it is difficult to assess how much each 
factor contributes to a given vote in the Human Rights Council, it is clear 
that state alliances in particular play a crucial role in the UN human rights 
machinery, often providing strong vehicles for collectively promoting human 
rights ideologies. Alliances are based on regional and political connections. 
States with similar forms of governance are frequently allied through regional 
groups, political blocs, or both. The Latin American and Caribbean Group 
regional group—officially called ‘GRULAC’—largely consists of states with 
newer and/or weaker democracies. Many GRULAC countries have a recent 
history of military rule and therefore democratization has only occurred 
within living memory. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a 
political bloc, has many members with dictatorial or autocratic regimes or 
countries that only very recently, since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 
2011, have seen public uprisings and movement toward democracy. The 
Western European and Others Group consists of liberal democracies and 
bears a significant overlap between membership of that regional group and 
membership of the European Union political bloc. Forms of government 
and their ideologies play a crucial role in the political alliances between 
states. The growth in number and power of states from the Global South 
has resulted in a significant shift in world politics with the result that those 
countries, groups, and blocs are now able to dominate proceedings within 
most international institutions. That ability to dominate means that those 
countries are able to promote and impose their own political ideologies 
and objectives within those fora. 
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The impact of regional groups and political blocs has been documented 
by legal scholars21 and political scientists22 and those alliances have used 
various tactics to promote their own objectives on human rights.23 The current 
composition of the Human Rights Council, with proportionate geographic 
representation, results in the African and Asian Groups together holding an 
overall majority.24 The political alliances of developing states through the 
Non-Aligned Movement25 and Islamic countries through the OIC26 dominate 
proceedings. The predominant forms of governance within, and types of 
national interests typically pursued by, states members of those groups and 
blocs necessarily impact the emphasis that the Council places on particular 
types of rights. This is demonstrated in particular by the Council’s creation 
and renewal of Special Procedures mandates and the manner in which there 
has been a shift away from focusing on CPRs owing to the proliferation of 
ESCR and TGR mandates over the past two decades. What we are concerned 
with, however, is the form of governance within each state supporting or 
promoting each type of right. 
 21. urfan KHaLiq, eTHicaL diMensions of THe foreign PoLicy of THe euroPean union: a LegaL aPPraisaL 
(2008); A.M. Abebe, Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Peri-
odic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 9 HuM. rTs. L. rev. 2 (2009); 
Nico Schrijver, The UN Human Rights Council: A New “Society of the Committed” or 
Just Old Wine in New Bottles, 20 Leiden J. inT’L. L. 809, 812 (2007).
 22. E.g. Joseph S. Nye, UNCTAD: Poor Nations’ Pressure Group, in THe anaToMy of infLuence: 
decision MaKing in inTernaTionaL organizaTion 334, 334–70 (Robert W. Cox & Harold K. 
Jacobson eds., 1973); geir LundesTad, easT, WesT, norTH, souTH: MaJor deveLoPMenTs on 
inTernaTionaL reLaTions since 1945 (5th ed. 1999); THoMas g. Weiss, WHaT’s Wrong WiTH THe 
uniTed naTions and HoW To fix iT 51 (2009).
 23. Cf. rosa freedMan, THe uniTed naTions HuMan rigHTs counciL: a criTique and earLy assessMenT 
119 (2013).
 24. G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 7 dictates that membership be “based on equitable geographical 
distribution.” The African Group hold thirteen seats, East European countries received 
six seats, GRULAC eight, Asia thirteen, and Western Europe and Others seven. G.A. 
Res. 60/251, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (2006).  
 25. NAM developed from the Asian-African Conference, a political gathering held in Band-
ung, Indonesia, in April 1955. The conference was convened in part due to frustration 
by many newly independent countries unable to secure UN membership due to Cold 
War politics. The two then-superpowers refused to admit states seen as belonging to 
the other camp. Indeed no new members were admitted between 1950 and 1954. See 
Weiss, supra note 22, at 51.
 26. The Organisation of Islamic Conference was established in 1969 to unite Muslim coun-
tries after the 1967 War, in which Israel established control of Jerusalem. The OIC, with 
fifty-seven member states, is the largest alliance of states within the UN. Membership 
consists of: twenty-one Sub-Saharan African, twelve Asian, eighteen Middle Eastern 
and North African States, three Eastern European and Caucasian, two South American, 
and one Permanent Observer Mission. See Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 
Permanent Missions of OIC Member States to the United Nations in New York, avail-
able at http://www.oicun.org/categories/Mission /Members/. Many of its members are 
influential within other groups or alliances. As such, the OIC has far-reaching political 
power. For example, in 2006, seventeen of the forty-seven Council member states were 
OIC members. Three OIC members, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Azerbaijan, chaired the 
regional groups for Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. 
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A. categorizing States’ Governance
In order to assess the impact of ideologies on the thematic rights that Special 
Procedures mandates are created to promote and protect, it is necessary to 
identify different forms of governance within states. It is therefore necessary 
to look at various methods for categorizing individual states. One method, 
adopted by James Lebovic and Eric Voeten,27 is to use Political Terror Scale 
values issued by the US State Department.28 Although the scores carry sig-
nificant weight when ranking countries, they are of greater interest to a US 
audience than a global one. Similarly, using European Union assessments of 
individual states might limit the applicability of, or at least interest in, this 
study. We deemed it most appropriate to use a generally-accepted ranking 
system created and deployed by an established NGO. 
Freedom House29 has long provided rankings based on states’ gover-
nance,30 which is directly applicable to this research. Although some criti-
cism has been leveled against the organization,31 it is widely-esteemed and 
oft-cited. Freedom House divides all states into categories of “Free,” “Partly 
Free,” and “Not Free” based on observance of civil and political rights.32 
Obviously this categorization is based on liberal democratic ideology, which 
places emphasis on its particular category of rights. As will be shown, 
countries classified as Free (F) are, at least nominally, liberal democracies 
from across the world; Partly Free (PF) countries include a broad range from 
near fully-fledged to emerging democracies; and Not Free (NF) states are 
governed by autocratic, dictatorial, and repressive regimes.33 
Freedom House conducts annual “comparative assessments of global 
political rights and civil liberties”34 and determines country rankings based 
on scores collectively grouped into those three categories. Countries are 
 27. James H. Lebovic & Eric Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country 
Human Rights Practices in the UNHCR, 50 inT’L sTud. q. 873 (2006).
 28. See Political Terror Scale, available at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/.
 29. Freedom House is a US—based NGO founded in 1941 to focus on civil liberties, politi-
cal freedoms and democracy. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/. 
 30. Cf. David A. Armstrong II, Stability and Change in the Freedom House Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties Measures, 48 J. Peace sTud. 653 (2011) examining Freedom House’s 
system for ranking states.
 31. E.g., Diego Giannone, Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement Of De-
mocracy: The Freedom House Case, 17 deMocraTizaTion 68 (2010); gerardo L. MuncK, 
Measuring deMocracy: a bridge beTWeen scHoLarsHiP and PoLiTics 28–33 (2009); edWard s. 
HerMan & noaM cHoMsKy, ManufacTuring consenT: THe PoLiTicaL econoMy of THe Mass Media 
(1988).
 32. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, Methodology, available at http://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology.
 33. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, Discarding Democracy: A Return to 
the Iron Fist, available at http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/discarding-
democracy-return-iron-fist.
 34. See Freedom House, Signature Reports: Freedom in the World, available at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/reports.
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evaluated on both political rights and civil liberties, with scores given out 
of seven. The combined scores for free countries are between 1–2.5; partly 
free countries score between 3–5; and not free countries score between 
5.5–7. A country’s ranking is not necessarily static; several countries have had 
their rankings changed over the years depending on the prevailing political 
climate at any given time. Similar categorization has occurred from other 
institutions such as The World Bank that seek to break down state institutions 
according to governmental indicators (including human rights compliance) 
in order to compare, measure, and classify forms of governance. Using these 
categorizations, we can loosely term these states “liberal democracies” (F), 
“emerging democracies” (PF), and “autocratic or repressive regimes” (NF). 
Human rights ideologies are intrinsically linked to the national govern-
ment and form of governance. There are political as well as governance 
reasons for countries’ human rights ideologies. Not Free and Partly Free 
governments are less likely to adhere to CPRs than Free states. The form of 
governance of NF states is often maintained by violating CPRs such as the 
freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. In particularly oppressive 
countries, violations will also include systematic torture and deprivation of 
the right to life. Our aim is to explore how those different forms of gover-
nance impact the development of human rights at the international level. Our 
methodology does not allow us to establish causality in patterns between 
type of governance and voting record, yet any correlation can potentially 
be indicative of a significant relationship especially if supported by other 
factors pointing in that direction. 
b. categorizing the Mandates 
As previously discussed, Special Procedures is comprised of individual man-
dates that focus either on a specific country or on a thematic right. Although 
thematic mandates may cover different human rights obligations, they can 
be divided largely according to the three categories of rights35: CPRs; ESCRs; 
and TGRs. These categories of rights are useful for exploring the expansion 
of Special Procedures over the past twenty years and for understanding the 
potential motivations of states for creating newer mandates.
When categorizing the mandates, we first look at whether the specific 
mandate relates to a right in an existing human rights treaty covering a 
 35. Although there is no official classification, the UN informally recognizes the division 
for example through the OHCHR ESCR Bulletin, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/ESCR/Pages/ESCRIndex.aspx, provides bi-monthly updates on matters relevant 
to ESCRs. In these bulletins, certain Special Procedures mandates are identified and 
reported upon at http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/401556 thus indicating a clear, albeit 
not official, categorization by the OHCHR.
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particular category. Thus, for instance, freedom of expression and opinion 
is protected by Article 19 of the ICCPR and the Special Procedure Mandate 
relating thereto should therefore clearly be categorized as CPR, whereas the 
right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health” can be found in Article 12 of the ICESCR and the Special 
Procedure mandate thereon should therefore be labelled as an ESCR. Certain 
other thematic mandates are more difficult to categorize especially since 
TGRs are not defined and have yet to be codified in international law. It 
should also be noted that certain mandates might take into account both 
aspects of CPRs and ESCRs.36 
c. Mapping the Data
Empirical research on states’ voting records regarding Special Procedures 
mandates enables us to determine which states are promoting CPR, ESCR, 
and TGR mandates, respectively. The research focuses on voting records for 
Special Procedures thematic mandates created under the former Commission 
on Human Rights and its successor body, the Human Rights Council. Each 
mandate has at least one resolution creating the mandate and all bar the 
newest ones, such as or those that have been discontinued have resolutions 
renewing the mandates.37 Generally, thematic mandates are renewed every 
three years, although some have a shorter period of duration specified in the 
original resolution creating the mandate. The Council considered all man-
dates as part of its Review, Rationalization and Improvement process,38 and 
therefore renewed the mandates as part of the transition from Commission 
to Council regardless of whether a mandate’s term of duration had expired.
It must be noted that the original resolution creating a mandate is often 
more contentious in terms of the debates surrounding the resolution and the 
 36. For our exact categorization of the thematic mandates see Appendix 1. 
 37. Two thematic mandates have been discontinued. The mandate on Impunity, first intro-
duced in C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/72 (2004), was discontinued 
after one year, as the independent expert had fulfilled his mandate of updating the “set 
of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to com-
bat immunity.” The second discontinued mandate was the independent expert/working 
group established “with a view to considering options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the ICESCR,” initially in C.H.R. Res. 2001/30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/2001/30 (2001). The mandate was fulfilled in 2008, when the working group sub-
mitted its proposal on the text of the optional protocol to the Human Rights Committee 
for consideration. 
 38. The Council was required to “maintain a system of special procedures, expert advice 
and a complaint procedure.” G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (2006). 
Schrijver notes that, prior to the Council’s creation, tensions arose regarding modifying 
the system (Schrijver, supra note 21, at 812–14). The compromise was to retain the 
system for the Council’s first year, and undertake a review as to whether to keep, and 
where necessary rationalize or improve, individual mandates.
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vote than what occurs for subsequent renewing resolutions. This may be a 
case of countries not wishing subsequently to revisit previous discussions 
and debates. Occasionally a renewing mandate is contentious in terms of 
discussions and votes, but this often occurs where countries, groups, or blocs 
seek to alter the mandate, as occurred with the 2008 renewing resolution 
on Freedom of Expression.39 That mandate was created in 199340 and had 
been in existence until 2008. In 2008, Canada proposed the renewing man-
date. The OIC tabled an amendment that called for an additional operative 
paragraph requiring the mandate holder to examine instances where “the 
abuse of the right of freedom of expression constitutes an act of racial or 
religious discrimination.”41 This was clearly targeted at an ongoing objective 
of creating a new right for people to not have their religion defamed.42 That 
issue had been raised elsewhere including at conferences and within UN 
bodies. Canada, in light of the broader context in which the amendment was 
tabled as well as the fundamental impact that it would have on the right to 
freedom of expression, raised considerable objections to the amendment.43 
It insisted that the amendment would fundamentally change the mandate 
holder’s role from promoting to policing the exercise of freedom of expres-
sion.44 Countries like Slovenia, Brazil, and India, alongside the usual Western 
states, asserted that this amendment would restrict the very right that the 
mandate sought to protect and promote.45 The mandate was adopted with 
the amendment despite the debate surrounding that renewing resolution.46 
 39. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to free-
dom of opinion and expression, H.R.C. Res. 7/36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/36 (2008).
 40. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, C.H.R. Res. 1993/45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/45 
(1993). 
 41. Introduced by Egypt (on behalf of the Group of African States), Pakistan (on behalf of 
the OIC member states) and Palestine (on behalf of the Group of Arab States) in draft 
amendment U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.39 (2008), debated on 28 Mar. 2008. 
 42. Cf.  Sejal Parmar, The Challenge of “Defamation of Religions” to Freedom of Expression 
and the International Human Rights System, 14 eur. HuM. rTs. L. rev. 353 (2009).
 43. Comments of the Canadian delegate in explanation of vote before the vote, during the 
42nd Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 28 Mar. 2008. The audio/visual record-
ing is a UN Webcast video on-demand, available at http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/
webcast/c/un-human-rights-council.html. 
 44. Id. “Instead of promoting freedom of expression, the special rapporteur would be policing 
its exercise. This would be a fundamental change to the mandate and a bad precedent 
for other special procedures.”
 45. Id. “For example, Slovenia (on behalf of the EU) opined that ‘the focus of the mandate 
must remain centered on its core notion to promote and protect the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. The amendment before us, L.39, as proposed by the OIC, does 
exactly the reverse. It shifts the mandate away from promoting freedom of expression 
towards restricting it.” 
 46. In favor: Angola(NF), Azerbaijan(NF), Bangladesh(PF), Bolivia(PF), Brazil(F), 
Cameroon(NF), China(NF), Cuba (NF), Djibouti (PF), Egypt(NF), Gabon(PF), Ghana(F), 
India(F), Indonesia(PF), Jordan(PF), Madagascar(PF), Malaysia(PF), Mali(F), Mauritius(F), 
Mexico(F), Nicaragua(PF), Nigeria(PF), Pakistan(PF), Peru(F), Qatar(NF), Russian 
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By 2011 and the mandate’s next renewal,47 the countries that opposed the 
amendment did not seek to repeat the 2008 discussions, demonstrating the 
inference that states choose not to re-engage in previous battles once they 
have clearly been lost. 
In order to determine which states promote and support different types 
of mandates, we examine voting records on the mandates. That analysis 
includes which countries sponsored resolutions owing to that being an 
indicator of promoting rather than just supporting. The mandate on toxic 
dumping, for example, had a significant number of sponsors (thirty-nine) 
that included twenty-nine African countries.48 It is fairly clear why African 
states promoted this mandate, as that region is the one most affected by 
toxic dumping.49 The mandate on countering terrorism, on the other hand, 
was sponsored by sixty-eight countries, most of which were not affected by 
the issue.50 However, countering terrorism was a significant political issue. 
Countries from the EU, GRULAC, and some others from WEOG were the 
main promoters of this mandate. Perhaps more interestingly, Egypt and Russia 
also sponsored the resolution. Both of the countries had their own internal 
political objectives regarding terrorism alongside foreign policy objectives 
based on US involvement with violations of CPRs while countering terrorism. 
Although any country may sponsor a resolution, only members of the 
Human Rights Council may vote. It is important to note that a country 
may not be involved in a resolution if it is neither a Council member nor 
a sponsor, and that a lack of involvement does not necessarily lead to any 
conclusions about that state’s stance on the mandate. Not all resolutions are 
adopted by vote. Where there is consensus there is no voting record per se, 
but it is clear that no state felt strongly enough to call for a vote in which 
they could register their abstention or disagreement with the mandate. Often 
such mandates are on issues that are universally recognized as crucial hu-
man rights, even if countries systematically violate those rights within their 
own territories. Examples include the mandates on the Sale of Children, 
   Federation(NF), Saudi Arabia(NF), Senegal(PF), South Africa(F), Sri Lanka(PF), Uruguay(F), 
Zambia(PF). Abstaining: Bosnia and Herzegovina(PF), Canada(F), France(F), Germany(F), 
Guatemala(PF), Italy(F), Japan(F), Netherlands(F), Philippines(PF), Republic of Korea(F), 
Romania(F), Slovenia(F), Switzerland(F), Ukraine(F), United Kingdom of Great Britain, 
and Northern Ireland(F). 
 47. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to free-
dom of opinion and expression, H.R.C. Res. 16/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/4 (2011).
 48. Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products 
and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, C.H.R. Res. 1995/81, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1995/81 (1995). 
 49. Id.
 50. Countering Terrorism, C.H.R. Res. 2005/80, U.N. E/CN.4/2005/80 (2005). 
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Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,51 Arbitrary Detention,52 Violence 
Against Women,53 and Contemporary Forms of Slavery.54 
Countries may abstain from the vote, which in itself can be quite tell-
ing. Abstentions are a method of registering non-acceptance of a particular 
provision or of the need for a mandate even if a country agrees with the right 
itself. This occurred during the vote on the 2008 renewal resolution for the 
mandate on freedom of expression and opinion; countries that supported 
the right but not the alteration of the mandate abstained during the vote in 
order to neither undermine the mandate nor support the tabled amendment.55 
When looking at votes and sponsors, we used Freedom House’s categori-
zation of F, PF, and NF for the particular year of the resolution. We identified 
how many F, PF, or NF states voted for, against, or abstained in the vote on 
each resolution. States such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Ukraine saw 
their classification change over time, altering the numbers of F, NF, and PF 
states on the Commission/Council. It must also be noted that with elections 
every year, a third of the Council’s members change and therefore there is 
always a difference in terms of the numbers of members with different types 
of governance sitting on the body. Geographic proportionate representation 
at the Council means that, thus far, there has almost always been a majority 
of NF and PF governance combined, but there is not always a majority of 
any one category of governance. 
D. Research Findings 
Special Procedures focused almost exclusively on CPRs until 1995 when the 
Commission on Human Rights created a TGR mandate on toxic dumping.56 
Since then, there has been a movement towards expanding the system to 
include ESCRs and TGRs by adding some twelve ESCR mandates,57 and four 
 51. Sale of Children, C.H.R. Res. 1990/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/68 (1990).
 52. Question of Arbitrary Detention, C.H.R. Res. 1991/42, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/42 (1991).
 53. Question of Integrating the Rights of Women Into the Human Rights Mechanisms of the 
United Nations and the Elimination of Violence Against Women, C.H.R. Res. 1994/45, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/45 (1994).
 54. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, H.R.C. Res. 6/14, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/RES/6/14 (2007).
 55. See supra notes 40–46 inclusive.
 56. The Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous 
Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment Of Human Rights, C.H.R. Res. 1995/81, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176 (1995).
 57. Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, C.H.R. Res. 1998/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/25 
(1998); Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social and cultural 
rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems which 
the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these human rights, C.H.R. Res. 
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TGR mandates.58 It is important to note that these figures do not include the 
so-called hybrid mandates that have been introduced since 1995: namely 
Human Rights of Migrants, Minority Issues, and Discrimination of Women 
in Law and in Practice. Mapping the data enables us to assess the extent 
to which forms of governance impact states’ approaches to the expansion 
of the system.
The first two ESCR mandates were on Poverty59 and Education,60 both 
created in 1998. Between 1995 and 2013, five TGR mandates and twelve 
ESCR mandates have been adopted. In that time there have been four new 
CPRs as traditionally understood,61 starting with Impunity in 2004.62 There 
   1998/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/33  (1998); Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, C.H.R. Res. 2000/9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/9 
(2000); Right to Food, C.H.R. Res. 2000/10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/10 (2000); The 
Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies and Foreign Debt, C.H.R. Res. 2000/82, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/82 (2000); Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, C.H.R. Res. 2001/30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/30 
(2001); Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physi-
cal and Mental Health, C.H.R. Res. 2002/31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/31 (2002); 
People of African Descent, C.H.R. Res. 2002/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/68 (2002); 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, C.H.R. 
Res. 2005/69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/69 (2005); Human Rights Obligations Related 
to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, H.R.C. Res. 7/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
RES/7/22 (2008); Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social 
and cultural rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special 
problems which the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these human 
rights, C.H.R. Res. 2001/30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/30 (2001);The Human Rights of 
Older Persons, H.R.C. Res. 24/20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/24/20 (2013).
 58. Right to Development, C.H.R. Res. 1998/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/72 [1998–2010] 
(1998); Human Rights and International Solidarity, C.H.R. Res. 2005/55, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/55 [2005–2014] (2005); Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable 
International Order, C.H.R. Res. 2005/57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/57 [2011–2014] 
(2005); Human Rights Obligations Related to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy 
and Sustainable Environment, H.R.C. Res. 19/10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/10 (2012).
 59. Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, supra note 57.
 60. Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social and cultural rights 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems which 
the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these human rights, supra note 
57, ¶ 6. 
 61. Updated Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through 
action to combat impunity, C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 
(2005);Contemporary Forms of Slavery Including its Causes and Consequences, H.R.C. 
Res. 6/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/14, (2007); The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association, H.R.C. Res. 15/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/21 (2010);Special Rap-
porteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guaranteed of non-recurrence, 
H.R.C. Res. 18/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/7 (2011) [2011–2014].
 62. Impunity, C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/72 (2004).
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have also been eight mandates,63 starting with Migrants in 1999,64 in which 
the resolution largely seeks to promote and protect CPRs, but only in rela-
tion to a specific group of people. The types of mandates have changed and 
expanded rapidly over almost twenty years. The purpose of our empirical 
research is to explore whether or not the system’s expansion has been im-
pacted by the type of governance within states that have been at the fore of 
promoting or supporting new mandates. The impact of those newer mandates 
will be explored in Section 5. Various reasons and motivations might be 
inferred from those actions, as will be explored in Section 6. 
E. Empirical Data on Voting Records
The data we use is from 1980 to the end of 2013. Of the nineteen CPR 
mandates,65 four resolutions creating the mandates were adopted by a 
 63. Human Rights of Migrants, C.H.R. Res. 1999/44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/44 (1999); 
Human Rights Defenders, C.H.R. Res. 2000/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 (2000); 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, C.H.R. Res. 2001/57, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57 (2001); Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance, C.H.R. Res. 2002/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/68 (2002); Traf-
ficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, C.H.R. Res. 2004/110, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/DEC/2004/110 (2004); Minority Issues, C.H.R. Res. 2005/79, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/2005/79 (2004); Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, H.R.C. Res. 
15/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/23 (2010); The Human Rights of Older Persons, supra 
note 57. 
 64. Human Rights of Migrants, C.H.R. Res. 1999/44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/44 (1999);
 65. Question of missing and disappeared persons, C.H.R. Res. 20 (XXXVI), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/1980/20 (1980), [in operation from: 1980–2014]; Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
C.H.R. Res. 1982/29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/29 (1982) [1982–2014];Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Or Punishment, C.H.R. Res. 1985/33, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1985/33 (1985) [1985–2014]; Religious Tolerance (Freedom of Religion or Belief), 
C.H.R. Res. 1986/20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/20 (1986) [1986–2013]; Sale of Children, 
C.H.R. Res. 1990/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/68 (1990); Internally Displaced Persons, 
C.H.R. Res. 1992/73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/73 (1992) [1992–2013]; Measures to com-
bat contemporary forms of racism, discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, 
C.H.R. Res. 1993/20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/20 (1993) [1993–2014]; Right to freedom 
of opinion and expression, C.H.R. Res. 1994/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1994/33 (1994) 
[1994–2014]; Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and 
the independence of lawyers, C.H.R. Res. 1994/41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/41 (1994) 
[1994–2014];  Questions of integrating the rights of women into the human rights 
mechanisms of the United Nations and the elimination of Violence against women, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/45 (1994) [1994–2014); Human Rights Defenders, C.H.R. Res. 
2000/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 (2000); Human Rights and indigenous issues, 
C.H.R. Res. 2001/57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57 (2001) [2001–2013]; Updated 
Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 
combat impunity, C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005); Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, C.H.R. Res. 
2004/110, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2004/110 (2004) [2004–2014]; The Promotion and 
Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
C.H.R. Res. 2005/80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/80 (2005) [2005–2013]; Contemporary 
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vote.66 On average, twenty F, nine PF, and five NF countries voted for the 
resolutions; zero F, zero PF and two NF countries voted against; and less 
than one F, two PF and six NF countries abstained.67 As a percentage of the 
vote, on average 58 percent F of countries, 15 percent of PF, and 27 percent 
of NF voted for the resolutions and 7 percent of F countries, 26 of percent 
PF, and 67 of percent NF abstained. No PF states voted against a CPR man-
date.68 Of the remaining fifteen mandates adopted without a vote, on average 
twenty-four F countries, nine PF, and four NF sponsored the introduction of 
the resolutions. It is clear from this data that F countries are far more likely 
to promote or support CPR mandates than both PF and NF states. 
For the twelve ESCR mandates,69 six resolutions creating or renewing 
the mandates were adopted by a vote.70 On average, sixteen F countries, 
thirteen PF, and twelve NF voted for the resolutions; seven F countries, zero 
   Forms of Slavery Including its Causes and Consequences, H.R.C. Res. 6/14, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/6/14, (2007) [2007–2013]; The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association, H.R.C. Res. 15/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/21 (2010); Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guaranteed of non-recurrence, H.R.C. 
Res. 18/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/7 (2011) [2011–2014]. 
 66. Summary or Arbitrary Executions, C.H.R. Res. 1982/29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/29 
(1982) [1982–2014]; Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 65; Religious Tolerance/Freedom of Religion or Belief, supra 
note 65; Human Rights Defenders, supra note 65.
 67. This average is based on the median results for three out of the four CPR mandates that 
were adopted by vote as the voting breakdown for extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions. See supra note 65.
 68. The mandate on “The use of mercenaries as a means of impeding the exercise of the 
right of peoples to self-determination,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/16) (9 Mar. 1987), does 
not fall readily within any of the three categories of CPR, ESCR or TGR given the hybrid 
nature of this right. For this reason it is not included in the data. 
 69. Human Rights And Extreme Poverty, supra note 57; Right to Education, supra note 57; 
Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, 
supra note 57; Right to Food, supra note 57; The effects of structural adjustment policies 
and foreign debt, supra note 57; Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,  supra note 57; 
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and 
Mental Health, supra note 57 [2002–2013]; Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
and related intolerance, supra note 63; Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, supra note 58; Human Rights Obligations Related to 
Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, supra note 57 [2008–2014]; Question of 
the realization in all countries of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems which the developing 
countries face in their efforts to achieve these human rights, supra note 57; The Human 
Rights of Older Persons, supra note 57.
 70. Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social and cultural rights 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems which 
the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these human rights, supra note 
57; Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, supra note 57; Right to Food, supra note 57; 
The effects of structural adjustment policies and foreign debt, supra note 57; Racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, supra note 63; Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, supra note 58.
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PF, and zero NF voted against; and two F countries, two PF, and less than 
one NF abstained.71 As a percentage of the vote, on average 35 percent of F 
countries, 33 percent of PF, and 32 percent of NF voted for the resolutions. 
No PF or NF countries have ever voted against the creation of an ESCR 
mandate. Of the remaining five mandates adopted without a vote, on aver-
age twenty F countries, eight PF, and five NF sponsored the introduction of 
the resolutions. Thus, while F countries have been marginally more likely 
than PF and NF countries to support ESCR mandates they have also been, by 
far, the most likely to oppose and vote against such mandates. This suggests 
that F countries’ attitude towards ESCR is mixed and very much dependent 
on the specific nature of the right in question, whereas PF and NF countries 
seem to view all ESCRs as a priority. The difference in data between CPR and 
ESCR mandates is clear: NF and PF countries are far more likely to promote 
or support ESCR than CPR mandates. F countries are often supportive of 
ESCR mandates but are also more likely to vote against or abstain on ESCR 
than CPR mandates.
For the five TGR mandates, seventy-three resolutions creating the 
mandates were adopted by a vote.72 On average, seven F, fourteen PF, and 
twelve NF countries voted for the resolutions; thirteen F countries, less than 
one PF, and less than one NF voted against; and two F countries, two PF, 
and less than one NF abstained. As a percentage of the vote, on average 
21 percent of F countries, 43 percent of PF, and 36 percent of NF voted for 
the resolutions; 93 percent of F countries, 5 percent of PF, and 2 percent of 
NF voted against; and 31 percent of F countries, 29 percent of PF, and 40 
percent of NF abstained. The data again shows ideological divisions between 
forms of governance and types of mandates that states promote or support. 
The NF and PF states are more likely to push for TGR mandates, whereas F 
states overwhelmingly register dissent through voting against the resolutions.
IV. ANALYSIS 
Our research findings73 show that Free states will almost always support and 
almost never vote against CPR mandates, whereas their record on ESCRs is 
more mixed and the record on TGRs shows that F states are decidedly skepti-
 71. Based on average of five of the six mandates as no voting data was available for the 
Right to Education in Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social 
and cultural rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special 
problems which the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these human 
rights, supra note 57. 
 72. The Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping, supra note 56; Human Rights 
and International Solidarity, supra note 58; Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable 
International Order, supra note 58.
 73. Which we set out in detail in a forthcoming article based on this research.
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cal about this new generation of rights.74 Not Free states are most inclined 
to vote for TGRs and, to a lesser extent, sponsor ESCR mandates, but rarely 
promote CPRs even though they do at times vote for those mandates. Partly 
Free states are most inclined toward TGRs, but also promote and support 
ESCRs. Although it is not appropriate to explore all of the relevant mandates 
and voting records here, it is interesting to demonstrate these findings with 
reference to particular resolutions and to the countries that promoted or 
sought to undermine different mandates. This will inform and illustrate our 
analysis75 of these research findings.
The 2000 resolution on the CPR mandate of Human Rights Defenders was 
adopted by fifty votes in favor,76 zero against, and three abstentions: China, 
Cuba, and Rwanda, all three NF states with poor records of implementing 
rights for Human Rights Defenders.77 Unsurprisingly, given its own record 
of harassing and imprisoning human rights defenders, China asserted that 
the mandate was unnecessary, claiming that Human Rights Defenders were 
adequately protected by other mandates, thus rendering the new mechanism 
obsolete.78 The Cuban delegate went further, insisting that the mandate was 
not necessary owing to: “[T]he guise of “human rights defender” was often 
assumed by those who were bent on subversion. In Cuba, the United States 
subcontracted so-called human rights defenders to channel extensive fund-
ing to subversives.”79 
 74. Exceptions include Mercenaries supra and the renewal of Freedom of Expression 2008 
supra. 
 75. See Section 5 infra.
 76. Of the fifty states to vote in favor, twenty-six were F countries: Argentina, Botswana, 
Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States; sixteen were PF countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, the Congo, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Madagascar, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, 
Venezuela, and Zambia; and eight were NF countries: Bhutan, Burundi, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Russia, Sudan, Swaziland, and Tunisia. 
 77. In its annual country report on China in 2000, Amnesty International (AI) highlighted 
that “[t]he human rights situation in China deteriorated sharply during the year. Those 
targeted in the crack-down included political dissidents, anti-corruption campaigners, 
labour rights activists, human rights defenders and members of unofficial religious or 
spiritual groups.” aMnesTy inTernaTionaL, aMnesTy inTernaTionaL rePorT 2000: cHina, incLuding 
Hong Kong and Macao (2000), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa1138.
html. In its report on Cuba for 2000, similar concerns were raised by AI again, where 
it was highlighted that “[d]issidents, who included journalists, political opponents and 
human rights defenders, suffered severe harassment during the year. Several hundred 
people remained imprisoned for political offences, some of whom were recognized by 
AI as prisoners of conscience.” aMnesTy inTernaTionaL, aMnesTy inTernaTionaL rePorT 2000: 
cuba (2000), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0e14.html. 
 78. See statement of Mr. Sun Ang, as recorded in the Summary Record of the 66th Meeting 
of the Commission on Human Rights, C.H.R., ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.66 
(2000).
 79. See statement of Mr. Alfonso Martinez, as recorded in the Summary Record of the 65th 
Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, C.H.R., ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/
SR.65 (2000). 
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The CPR mandate on Freedom of Association was adopted in 201080 
without a vote. Interestingly this mandate included sixty-three cosponsors: 
forty-seven F,81 fifteen PF,82 and one NF.83 During discussions about the reso-
lution, statements made by NF states demonstrated their strength of feeling 
against the mandate. During discussions, a number of NF countries that did 
not sponsor the resolution made statements that sought to undermine the 
mandate. China asserted that the right contained nonabsolute obligations and 
that the mandate should take into account differing opinions, particularly of 
developing countries.84 Russia, Libya, and Pakistan all insisted that mecha-
nisms such as CERD85 and the International Labour Organisation86already 
adequately addressed the substantive issues covered by the mandate. They 
argued that the new mandate would simply further reduce funding and 
resources for Special Procedures and the Council.87 This is an interesting 
point to note owing to the ongoing discussion about whether or not TGRs 
and some ESCRs mandates were being created simply to dilute rather than 
enhance the Special Procedures system.88 Cuba, mirroring its stance on the 
mandate on human rights defenders, expressed its opposition to the mandate 
by arguing that some of the cosponsors 
criminalise the movements of national liberation that fought against colonial-
ism and apartheid [and funded] activities in other countries that are unconsti-
tutional . . . some of the co-sponsors have xenophobic parties who are racist 
in nature . . . who have organisations that fight against the dignity of other 
human beings.89
 80. H.R.C. Res. 15/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/21 (2010).
 81. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and the United States.
 82. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, and FYR Macedonia. 
 83. Somalia.
 84 See Statements by the Chinese Delegate, Made During Discussion of Draft Resolution, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.23, 32nd Meeting of the Human Rights Council, (30 Sept. 2010). 
The audio/visual recording is available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.
asp?go=100930.
 85. See comments by the Russian delegate concerning the provisions already provided 
for under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Racist Discrimination 
(ICERD) that e.g. ban activities of racist organizations vis-à-vis association and assembly. 
Id.
 86. See comments of the delegates from Libya, Pakistan and Cuba vis-à-vis the role of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). Id.
 87. Id. 
 88. See Section 5 infra.
 89. See comments made by the Cuban delegate, Id. 
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The ESCR mandate on Extreme Poverty was created in 199890 and was 
adopted with fifty-one votes in favor and one against. The votes in favor 
demonstrate participation across the board, with twenty-five F countries,91 
sixteen PF,92 and ten NF.93 The US was the only country to vote against 
this mandate, citing “budgetary concerns” as its reason for not supporting 
the mandate.94 That vote can be interpreted in light of the US approach to 
ESCRs; the vote may be viewed as ideological, particularly owing to this 
being the first ESCR mandate and therefore the first opportunity for the US 
to promote its ideology within the Special Procedures system. Opposition 
to the mandate can also be understood in light of the mandate’s substance 
not falling directly within the prism of human rights. Indeed, the mandate 
holder’s reports and activities have largely focused on financial institutions 
and programs at the national, regional and international levels. 
The ESCR mandate on Foreign Debt created in 200095 proved more 
contentious than the mandate on Extreme Poverty. Thirty countries voted 
for the mandate,96 fifteen against,97 and seven abstained.98 Six F,99 fourteen 
PF,100 and ten NF101 countries voted for the mandate, while all fifteen coun-
tries opposing it were Free and came from the EU and its regional allies in 
WEOG. The same bloc voting occurred in the renewal resolutions in 2008102 
and 2011;103 a North-South104 divide is clear regarding this mandate. Dur-
ing discussions on the 2008 resolution, the EU expressed unease with the 
 90. C.H.R. Res. 1998/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/25 (1998). 
 91. Argentina, Austria, Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Mali, the Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
and Venezuela. 
 92. Bangladesh, Brazil, Guatemala, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Ukraine. 
 93. Belarus, Bhutan, China, the Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, 
Russia, Sudan, and Tunisia. 
 94. Report of the 54th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 16 Mar—24 Apr. 1998, 
U.N. Doc. E/1998/23 (1998). 
 95. C.H.R. Res. 2000/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/82 (2000).
 96. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, China, the Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
 97. Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 98. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Republic of Korea, and Russia. 
 99. Botswana, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, and the Philippines.
100. Bangladesh, Brazil, the Congo, Ecuador, Guatemala, Madagascar, Morocco, Nepal, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
101. Bhutan, Burundi, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland and Tunisia. 
102. H.R.C. Res. 7/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/4 (2008). 
103. H.R.C. Res. 16/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/14 (2011). 
104. Cf. Weiss, supra note 22, who adopts this terminology to explain the current geopolitical 
divisions at the UN. 
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mandate claiming “pontification of minimum standards.”105 In 2011, the 
US asserted that the Council is “technically incompetent” to address issues 
like foreign debt, and that “rules other than human rights laws are more 
relevant.”106 These comments are crucial for understanding opposition both 
to this mandate and to the more general expansion of Special Procedures 
to include so-called rights that focus on other areas than ones traditionally 
associated with human rights and that often lack support in binding trea-
ties. The concern was also raised that such a mandate would shift focus and 
funds away from other more pressing and serious human rights violations.107
The TGR mandate on International Solidarity was created in 2005.108 
The preamble to mandate sets out that it: “Recognizes that the so-called 
“third-generation rights” closely interrelated to the fundamental value of 
solidarity need further progressive development within the United Nations 
human rights machinery in order to be able to respond to the increasing 
challenges of international cooperation in this field.”109 Cuba introduced the 
resolution by saying that it is “aimed at promoting the recent development 
of the rights of the third generation, such as the right to peace, the right to 
development and the right to a healthy environment.”110 The voting patterns 
on the resolution creating the mandate and the two renewal resolutions111 
show clear bloc voting. WEOG consistently voted against these resolutions,112 
while GRULAC, which has a significant representation of PF states,113 voted 
in favor.114 The EU insisted that Special Procedures ought to focus on the 
105. See the statement made by the Slovenian delegate (on behalf of the EU), during discus-
sion of draft resolution U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.9, 39th Meeting of the Human Rights 
Council, (2008). The audio/visual recording is available at http://www.un.org/webcast/
unhrc/archive.asp?go=080327.
106. See the statement made by the US delegate, during discussion of draft resolution U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/16/L.18, 46th Meeting of the Human Rights Council, (2011). The audio/
visual recording is available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110324.
107. Id. 
108. C.H.R. Res. 2005/55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/55 (2005).
109. Id. ¶ 5.
110. See comments by the Cuban delegate during discussion of draft resolution U.N. E/
CN.4/2005/L.71, as recorded in the Summary Record of 58th Meeting of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights. C.H.R. Res. E/CN.4/2005/L.71, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/
SR.58 (2005). 
111. H.R.C. Res. 7/5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/5 (2008); H.R.C. Res. 17/6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
RES/17/6 (2011).
112. The following WEOG states voted against the mandate: C.H.R. Res. 2005/55 (2005): 
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States; H.R.C. Res. 7/5 (2008): Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; H.R.C. Res. 17/6 (2011): 
Belgium, France, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
113. As per 2013 Freedom House ranking, of the 33 countries of GRULAC, 22 were classified 
as F, 10 as PF and 1 as NF. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013, available 
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013.
114. The following GRULAC states voted for the mandate: C.H.R. Res. 2005/55 (2005): 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
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duties of states to their citizens rather than of states to other states.115 During 
discussions on the 2011 resolution, the EU argued that the moral nature of 
the concept of international solidarity makes it difficult to transform it into a 
legally valuable and binding human right.116 It argued that the lack of clear 
definition of the entitlements of the right-holders and responsibilities of the 
duty bearers means that the so-called right risks are redundant.117 
The TGR mandate on a Democratic and Equitable International Order 
was created in 2011.118 It was adopted by twenty-nine votes in favor,119 
twelve against,120 and five abstentions.121 The abstentions largely came from 
Latin America,122 while EU and WEOG once again voted against this man-
date. The PF123 and NF124 states account for twenty-three of the twenty-nine 
votes in favor. During discussions on the resolution, Cuba introduced the 
mandate as based on a need for international cooperation for realization of 
“economic and social advancement of all peoples.”125 The EU asked for an 
amendment that also focused on democracy at a national level and plural-
ity of political parties, as well as insisting that the mandate should focus 
on freedom of expression.126 The EU insisted that such amendments would 
at least make a contribution to human rights,127 echoing previous concerns 
   Honduras, Ecuador and Mexico; H.R.C. Res. 7/5 (2008): Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Gua-
temala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay; H.R.C. Res. 17/6 (2011): Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay.
115. See comments by the Dutch delegate (speaking on behalf of the EU) during discussion of 
draft resolution E/CN.4/2005/L.71, as recorded in the Summary Record of 58th Meeting 
of the Commission on Human Rights. C.H.R. Res. E/CN.4/2005/L.71, ¶ 30. U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/SR.58 (2005). 
116. See the statement made by the Hungarian delegate, during discussion of draft resolution 
A/HRC/17/L.21 at the 33rd Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 16 June 2011. The 
audio-visual recording is a UN Webcast archived video, available at http://www.un.org/
webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110616.
117. Id.
118. H.R.C. Res. 18/6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/6 (2011).
119. Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, the Congo, 
Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, the Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Thailand, Uganda, and Uruguay. 
120. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. 
121. Chile, Costa Rica, Mauritania, Mexico, and Peru. 
122. Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, accounting for three of the five abstentions. 
123. Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, and Uganda. 
124. Angola, Cameroon, China, the Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Jordan, Qatar, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia. 
125. Supra note 118, pmbl.
126. Poland: Amendments to Draft Resolution A/HRC/18/L.13, H.R.C. Res. A/HRC/18/L13, 
at 90, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/L.33 (2011). 
127. Id. See comments by the Polish delegate (speaking on behalf of the EU) during discus-
sion of draft resolution A/HRC/18/L.33. The audio/visual recording is available as a UN 
Webcast, archived video, available at  http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/
cuba-vote-on-l13-item1-35th-plenary-meeting-18th-session.html.  
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that such mandates are far removed from the human rights matrix.128 Cuba 
responded by accusing the EU of bad faith, politicization, and double 
standards.129 Similarly, when the US voiced concerns about the mandate,130 
Cuba responded by accusing the US of genocide of indigenous people131 
as opposed to addressing the substance of the issues raised.
Alongside analyzing votes on the mandates, the research charts the 
voting records of individual states. Although this analysis goes beyond the 
scope of this particular article, there are interesting differences between vot-
ing patterns of states with the same category of governance. Within the Free 
category, Canada uses its vote to take a demonstrative stance supported by 
ideological comments during discussions. Brazil takes a different approach, 
generally voting in favor of all rights. Canada is strongly allied with WEOG 
countries and has been known to take a liberal ideological stance at the 
Human Rights Council.132 To a large extent, Brazil is the F representative 
of the Global South and its voting record can be understood accordingly. 
Within the PF category, Nigeria can be contrasted with Mexico. The two 
countries’ regional133 and political134 alliances arguably have influenced 
their voting records, with Mexico abstaining on several occasions135 on is-
sues more likely to impact Nigeria or its allies.136 In the NF category, Cuba 
and Russia have taken different approaches to Special Procedures despite 
historical similarities between their political ideologies and the close political 
alliance that they present at the Human Rights Council.137 Cuba has been 
128. See comment made by the Hungarian delegate during the discussion of the mandate 
on international solidarity, Id. at 170. 
129. See comments made by the Cuban delegate in asking for a vote on draft resolution A/
HRC/18/L.13 as orally amended by United States. The audio/visual recording, available 
at http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/c/un-human-rights-council.html.
130. See comments made by the US delegate, id. 
131. Id. at 135. 
132. See e.g., Freedman supra note 23, 197–252. 
133. Id. Nigeria is a member of the African Group; Mexico is a member of GRULAC.
134. Id. Nigeria is a member of the OIC; Mexico is a member of G8+5. 
135. Mexico abstained in the vote in the following: Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies 
and Foreign Debt on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, C.H.R. Res. 2000/82 (2000);  H.R.C. Res. 16/14 (2011); 
Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order H.R.C. Res. 18/6 (2011); 
Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products 
and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, C.H.R. Res. 1995/81. 
136. See discussion on toxic dumping supra.
137. There are some notable examples where Russia and China diverged in their otherwise 
generally similar voting pattern. Russia voted in favor of the mandate while China ab-
stained in Human Rights Defenders, C.H.R. Res. 2000/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 
(2000) . The reverse occurred during the vote on C.H.R. Res. 2000/82 where it was 
China that voted in favor of the mandate, while Russia abstained, Effects of structural 
adjustment policies and foreign debt on the full enjoyment of all human rights, par-
ticularly economic, social and cultural rights, C.H.R. Res. 2000/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/2000/82 (2000). However, the most flagrant break in voting alliance was visible 
in C.H.R. Res. 1995/81 where China voted in favor of the mandate while Russia voted 
against. Adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous 
products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights, C.H.R. Res. 1995/81, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1995/81 (1995). 
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at the fore in terms of championing TGRs and fits well within the general 
analysis on NF countries. Russia tends to vote with its political allies but 
has voted with WEOG on mandates such as Toxic Waste and Human Rights 
Defenders,138 which implies that there are broader political objectives un-
derlying its voting record.
V. IMPAcT oF MANDATE PRoLIFERATIoN
The research findings set out above demonstrate that some countries with 
poor human rights records, and that are classified as PF or NF, are among 
the active drivers behind the proliferation of rights expanding the focus of 
mandates from a more narrow focus on CPRs to a more expansive focus 
on ESCRs and also TGRs.
Many ESCR mandates were undoubtedly introduced and voted for out 
of genuine concern for the very real and pressing problems of international 
concern, such as global poverty, inequality, food crisis, and the stark dif-
ferences in living standards between developed and developing countries. 
However, the significant differences in voting patterns between F, PF, and 
NF countries, as well as the examples of how specific PF and NF states have 
utilized ESCR and TGR mandates (explored in more detail below), suggest 
that a minority of active states have more mixed or outright nefarious agen-
das when it comes to mandate proliferation. By inflating the number and 
scope of human rights addressed by mandate holders, the focus of Special 
Rapporteurs will often be less critical and violations oriented.
Despite the formal UN-wide agreement on the indivisibility of all human 
rights, the nature of ESCRs, and in particular TGR mandates, is often very 
different from the nature of CPR mandates. CPR mandates tend to have a 
more narrow focus and deal with rights that have relatively well-established 
normative content, where gross and systematic violations are immediately 
apparent and identifiable and closely associated with authoritarianism, thus 
much more likely to cause embarrassment, scrutiny, and condemnation. De-
spite detailed general comments, an increase in national constitutions with 
justiciable ESCRs and the adoption of an optional protocol to the ICESCR, 
ESCRs tend to be more abstract and identification of individual violations 
are often less clear cut than when it comes to systematic violations of CPRs. 
In the words of Emilie M. Hafner-Burton “there is no consensus on how 
exactly to measure these violations [of ESCRs].”139 
Outside of situations in which governments forcibly withhold food,140 
engage in systematic discrimination, or adopt policies of large-scale forced 
evictions, it is often much more difficult to determine when ESCRs have 
been violated and what government policy or (in)action caused poverty, 
138. Id.
139. eMiLie M. Hafner-burTon, MaKing HuMan rigHTs a reaLiTy 78 (2013).
140. As has occurred throughout the recent civil war in Syria.
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housing crises, or food shortages. This is also supported by the biases of 
international human rights organizations formally committed to indivisibility. 
In a brief and non-exhaustive study of Amnesty International’s human rights 
priorities Mchangama found that Amnesty continues to prioritize work on 
CPRs: 80 per cent of the rights violations identified in Amnesty’s reports on 
10 “Global Players” related to civil and political rights, 12 per cent related 
to “hybrid rights” (such as rights of migrants that include both elements of 
CPR and ESCRs) and a mere 8 per cent of the rights identified were ESCRs. 
For the 10 least developed states the corresponding numbers were 86, 10 
and 4 per cent respectively.141 Moreover, governments accused of violating 
ESCRs will often be able to argue that resource constraints hinder them from 
fulfilling these rights, and because most states do in fact spend resources on 
education, health, and housing, governments will often be able to point to 
accomplishments that can be used to demonstrate commitment to ESCRs and 
which in turn invites praise from both Special Procedures and other states.
TGRs differ from both CPRs and ESCRs by often placing states or people 
rather than individuals as right holders. They also differ in that they are drafted 
in a very vague and unclear manner with no immediately clear normative 
content and thus little opportunity for Special Rapporteurs to identify and 
expose gross and systematic violations. This development also means that 
mandate holders are required to address matters falling outside of the human 
rights matrix and thus beyond their expertise. Secondly, mandate holders face 
difficulties in assessing compliance with the substantive rights. There is no 
method for assessing whether a state complies with the right to international 
solidarity or just international order—those rights are not enshrined in exist-
ing legally-binding conventions nor are they properly defined. Accordingly, 
there seems to be little substantive merit to these types of TGR mandates, 
however, important and compelling the problems such mandates formally 
address. CPR mandates, on the other hand, focus on rights such as freedom 
of expression, religion, assembly, and association, which are more easily 
definable and therefore it is often more clear when states violate them in a 
systematic fashion.
The mandate on Foreign Debt is one example of the contrast between 
TGR and other mandates. The Foreign Debt mandate holders have undertaken 
fifteen country visits during the thirteen-year duration of the mandate.142 Al-
most all CPR mandate holders undertake at least three, if not more, country 
visits per year whereas other mandate holders, particularly TGRs, may well 
141. Jacob Mchangama, Against a human rights based approach to social justice: Can human 
rights bring social justice? Twelve essays Edited by Doutje Lettinga & Lars van Troost 
(2015) available at http://justitia-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015-09-24_Am-
nesty_Can-human-rights-bring-social-justice_essay1.pdf.
142. A full list of countries, plus individual reports is on the mandate’s page, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx.
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conduct fewer such visits. Country visits enable fact-finding, monitoring, and 
dialogues with national human rights activists and victims of violations. With 
the expansion of Special Procedures and the dilution of available resources 
as well as the increased demand on states to accept visit requests, the num-
ber of country visits has been more varied across mandates than when the 
system was smaller. Despite this, a ratio of 0.6 visits per year is significantly 
lower than almost all other mandates.143 The mandate holder on Foreign 
Debt struggled to convince states of the need, or even ability, to monitor and 
fact-find within their territories. The vague and broad provisions within the 
mandate, coupled with the lack of tangible victims owing to ill-defined so-
called rights, made both country visits and reports more or less meaningless 
and devoid of impact. This demonstrates the extent to which the mandate 
on Foreign Debt is misplaced, at best, or even redundant within the human 
rights matrix. Yet the mandate draws logistical, research and other support 
from OHCHR and requires time to be devoted to it during Human Rights 
Council sessions. Moreover, it shifts the focus away from tangible victims 
of tangible rights, and therefore it is clear why such a mandate is attractive 
for states seeking to dilute or undermine the system.
It is important to explore not only the increasing numbers of mandates 
and which states support or promote mandates on different types of rights, 
but also how states then use those mandates to pursue their own political 
objectives. Once created, these newer mandates have significant impact not 
only in terms of changing the nature of what constitutes a right, but also in 
terms of enabling states to avoid their obligations to uphold traditional rights. 
In order to understand the practicalities of this broader impact we shall 
explore how mandate holders on certain CPRs, ESCRs, and TGRs have 
been received by the state that exemplifies the politicized motives for the 
proliferation of mandates. As previously discussed, Cuba is responsible for 
introducing six new thematic mandates, all of which address ESCRs or TGRs. 
From the outset, this activity could be interpreted as evidence of a deeply 
held Cuban commitment to human rights and their effective protection 
through the UN system. Yet, as we have seen in terms of Cuba’s approach 
to the mandate on human rights defenders and as we shall explore further, 
Cuba’s approach to and relationship with Special Procedures is much more 
complicated than suggested by the number of mandates it has introduced. 
In the 1990s Cuba allowed the visits of the Special Rapporteurs on 
Mercenaries and Violence against Women,144 but ignored a request and 
143.  OHCHR, Country Visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council Since 
1998, available at http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/View-
CountryVisits.aspx. 
144. Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against 
Women, C.H.R. Res. 1997/44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/68/Add.2 (2000); The Right 
of Peoples to Self-Determine and its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien 
Domination or Foreign Occupation, C.H.R. Res. 1999/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/14 
(1999). 
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two subsequent reminders from the Special Rapporteur on Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers.145 In 2002, the Secretary General appointed a Personal 
Representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights146 on the situa-
tion of human rights in Cuba. Yet Cuba never recognized the mandate nor 
did Cuba allow the representative access to the country. In 2007, a majority 
of the HRC decided to discontinue the country-specific mandate on Cuba. 
In 2006, Cuba ignored a request from the Special Rapporteur on freedom 
of religion and in 2011 it ignored a request from the Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of association and assembly. In 2009, Cuba agreed to a visit by 
the Special Rapporteur on Torture,147 yet the Special Rapporteur had to send 
a reminder in 2013 and the visit is yet to be carried out. In 2007, for the 
first time in eight years, Cuba accepted a request from a Special Procedures 
mandate holder, namely the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food,148 a 
mandate created through the sponsorship of Cuba. That Rapporteur held 
several meetings with high level members of the Cuban government and 
issued a report to the HRC which generally praised Cuba’s human rights 
record on the right to food and refrained from mentioning or criticizing the 
Cuban government’s systematic violations of civil and political rights.149 
Accordingly, while Cuba has been supportive of and willing to cooperate 
with mandate holders on ESCRs and TGRs, it has often voted against CPR 
mandates and systematically refused cooperation with Special Rapporteurs 
on CPRs.150 There is also some evidence of rights proliferation creating 
cross-fertilization between the Special Procedures system and the Universal 
Periodic Review. Thus, in 2013 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
encouraged Cuba to “[p]romote the development of third generation rights, 
in particular the value of international solidarity.”151 Of course the mandate 
on International Solidarity was introduced by Cuba. 
It is not just Cuba that uses ESCR and TGR mandates for political objec-
tives unrelated to or that undermine human rights. There are countries that 
145. Country and Other Visits by Special Procedures Mandate Holders Since 1998 A-E by 
OHCHR, latest update 25 Sept. 2015, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
SP/Pages/countryvisitsa-e.aspx. 
146. Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, C.H.R. Res. 2003/13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/13 
(2003). 
147. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, H.R.C. Res. 8/8, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39 (2010). 
148. The visit was conducted between 28 Oct. and 6 Nov. 2007. The full report is available 
in U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/5/Add.3.
149. Id. ¶67. Special Rapporteur on the right to food (28 Oct to 6 Nov. 2007). 
150. Cuba has still numerous pending requests for country visits on core CPR mandates 
including: torture, freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and associa-
tion, and independence of judges and lawyers. See full list of accepted and pending 
requests at the official special procedures page of the OHCHR, supra note 145. 
151. See Universal Periodic Review of Cuba, 2nd Cycle, considered on 1 May 2013, Report 
of the Working Group. H.R.C. Res. 5/1, ¶ 170.64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/16 (2013). 
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commit egregious violations of CPRs, but use ESCR and TGR mandates as 
a smokescreen to divert attention away from those gross and systemic vio-
lations. Such states welcome in ESCR and TGR mandate holders and then 
point to positive reports as evidence of their human rights commitment. 
Syria provides a clear example of such behavior. In the summer and fall 
of 2010, less than a year before the uprisings against Bashar Al-Assad that 
would set off the current bloody civil war in Syria, the Special Rapporteurs 
on the right to food152 and health, respectively, were invited to visit Syria. 
These mandate holders met with several members of the Syrian government 
and issued reports that generally praised the human rights records of Syria 
but were silent on the repressive nature of the regime.153 The Special Rap-
porteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health stated that: “Syria’s commendable 
work in the last three decades to improve the health system as a whole, 
and its commitment to ensure access to healthcare for all” with regard to 
concerns the Special Rapporteur “noted with dismay that smoking is still 
highly prevalent in Syria.”154 
Prior to the visit of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture three requests for visits in 2005, 2007, and 
2010 ignored, whereas the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders 
had requests in 2008 and 2010 ignored. Syria has also ignored requests from 
the Working Group155 on arbitrary detention and the Working Group on 
enforced disappearances, whereas agreements were made with the Special 
Rapporteurs on summary executions and Internally Displaced persons as 
well as with the Working Group on Mercenaries yet none of these agree-
ments have been honored. 
The significant differences in voting and sponsorship between F, PF, 
and NF countries suggest that Special Procedures mandates are no longer 
being used solely to protect and promote human rights. Instead, that system 
has become yet another political and ideological battleground upon which 
F, PF, and NF countries seek to further their own objectives. The constant 
enlargement of the subject matter of thematic mandates, particularly TGR 
152. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food: Mission to Syria from 29 Aug. to 7 Sept. 
2010, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/SyriaMissionPrelimi-
naryConclusions_07092010.pdf.
153. View, e.g., Human Rights Watch report about Syria from 2013, available at http://www.
hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/syria. 
154. UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health: Visit to Syria, 6–14 Nov. 2010. Preliminary 
observations, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=10532&LangID=E.
155. See OHCHR, Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 
1998, http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewCountryVisits.
aspx
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mandates, has shifted the focus from protecting tangible rights of tangible 
victims of abuses and onto using the human rights matrix to address broader 
and more abstract issues only tangentially related to human rights. The human 
rights matrix, however, is often ill-suited for voicing criticism of particular 
governments’ abuse of specific citizens.
Mandate proliferation also has a significant impact on the technical and 
logistical way in which the Special Procedures system operates. As we have 
seen the Special Procedures system has expanded rapidly over the past two 
decades, yet the resources available have not increased in line with that 
expansion. Almost inevitably, the continued quantitative expansion of man-
dates without accompanying increases in resource allocation will negatively 
impact the quality of the work undertaken by individual mandate holders. 
The increased number of mandate holders results in a preponderance of 
reports that not only need to be translated and disseminated, but also that 
need to be discussed in interactive dialogues at Human Rights Council ses-
sions. The net result is that there is less and less time and attention devoted 
to any one mandate, thus undermining the impact that mandates holders 
may have on the protection and promotion of specific rights. Taking into 
account that all of the UN human rights activities are allotted a mere 3 
percent of the total UN budget, it is clearly unrealistic and unfeasible to 
expect the Special Procedures mandate holders to make any significant 
contribution to topics such as global poverty, climate change, foreign debt 
that are already addressed by specific international institutions with much 
more directly relevant expertise and solid funding.
VI. coNcLUDING obSERVATIoNS 
Rights proliferation is a significant concern and is increasingly discussed 
within the human rights community. Special Procedure mandates, despite 
being soft law, provide a microcosm for the issue of rights proliferation within 
the international arena. Exploring the creation of these mandates enables 
greater understanding of whether or not there is a link between forms of 
governance and the types of rights and mandates that states promote. 
The research findings suggest that there is indeed a prima facie link 
between forms of governance and the types of rights that states support or 
actively promote through the creation of Special Procedures mandates. Factors 
such as regional and bloc voting and vote trading, diplomatic negotiations, 
and foreign policy considerations unrelated to human rights undoubtedly play 
a significant role in establishing voting patterns. However, the link between 
governance and voting patterns on SPRs seems to have flown under the radar 
of practitioners and academics, but these preliminary findings suggest that 
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they must be included as a factor when understanding issues including the 
proliferation of Special Procedures mandates. 
It is also apparent from the research findings and our analysis that prolif-
eration of mandates is having a negative impact upon the special procedure 
system. At the most basic level, because there have not been increased re-
sources to match the increasing number of mandates, those mandate holders 
focusing on tangible violations of tangible rights are able to conduct fewer 
country visits, produce fewer reports and recommendations, and have less 
time to discuss their findings at the Human Rights Council. For example, in 
the OHCHR financial statement for 2012, of the total earmarked funding 
for specific mandates only 24 percent was allocated to CPRs, while ESCRs 
accounted for 44 percent and “Groups in Focus” received 32 percent.156 Al-
location of funds to CPR mandates was slightly higher in 2011, accounting 
for 36 percent, though still significantly trumped by ESCRs, which accounted 
for 46 percent (mandates on Groups in Focus receiving 19 percent of ear-
marked funding).157 Another key issue arising from mandate proliferation 
is that the diversion of resources away from traditional rights and toward 
substantive matters that ought to be addressed by bodies other than hu-
man rights institutions has shifted the focus away from individuals as rights 
holders. The newer mandates are designed in such a way as to be able to 
criticize countries for policy programs or interstate relations, or to criticize 
international institutions. The focus is being shifted away from the relation-
ship between states and individuals and toward examining state policies 
and foreign relations. Indeed there is no recognized method for assessing 
compliance with many of the newer rights, particularly TGRs, leading to 
problems in terms of protecting and promoting rights. These, and other, issues 
could be potential motivations for some states voting for newer mandates if 
those countries have nefarious reasons for wishing to undermine, dilute, or 
significantly alter the international human rights system. 
It becomes apparent, therefore, that there is a strong need for the human 
rights community not to view Special Procedures mandates in a vacuum and 
to take notice of what is occurring within that system. The creation of new 
mandates is just one example of rights proliferation within the international 
arena, and understanding how and why those mandates are being created 
and the broader impact that they have is key to the ongoing debates about 
the changing nature of international human rights law.
156. See oHcHr annuaL rePorT 2012, Financial Statements, at 145, available at http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2012/web_en/allegati/11_Financial_Statements.pdf.
157. See oHcHr annuaL rePorT 2011, Financial Statements, at 153, available at http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/allegati/17_Fi-
nancial_Statements.pdf. 
